Hirsch, Meaning, and Hermeneutics – Part 3

In two previous posts (part 1 and part 2), I have proposed that the traditional two-fold structure of meaning and significance, be made made a three-fold structure of meaning, implication, and significance.* (Hirsch included implication in meaning as do many, but a new book by Robert H. Stein reviewed here apparently makes this same three-fold distinction that I have offered.)

In a nutshell, meaning is what the human author intended to communicate. Implications are those things which are inherently connected with the author’s intention, but outside of his conscious thought and intention. Significance is the application of meaning and implication to any situation to which it might relate.

So here’s why I think this matters.

In Hirsch’s two-fold division, you end up with human authors “meaning” things that they have no knowledge of, much less intention of. In other words, an author “speaks better than he knows;” he has an unintentional intention. The passage’s meaning is then no longer subject to exegesis based on intent, since the meaning cannot be drawn out from the words the author used to communicate his intended message. If it’s in the words, it is separate from the author’s intent in context, in which case normal exegesis cannot draw it out, and which opens a rather large barn door to a text meaning anything at all (since the author’s intent is no longer controlling; future implications are of the reader’s world, not the author’s). The historical part of literal-grammatical-historical interpretation has reduced significance (no pun intended).

This problem has been answered in a number of ways, primarily some form of sensus plenior, the idea that there is a “deeper meaning, intended by God but not clearly intended by the human author, that is seen to exist in the words of Scripture when they are studied in the light of further revelation or of development in the understanding of revelation.”[1]

While there are a number of problems with sensus plenior, but a major one is that it removes the possibility of exegesis of a text to arrive at the complete meaning, because the meaning is no longer in the words as the author used them to communicate to his readers. The fuller meaning is found in later words by different authors in different historical contexts, which which the original readers would not have had, and could not have known. Typically, this fuller meaning is found in the canonical context, which means the whole text of Scripture.

This is where the category of implication is helpful. It allows for there to be truth in a text that is not part of meaning. These implications are seen in later revelation, but they are not what the author meant his original readers to understand and respond to (which is what meaning must be connected to: what did the original author intend his original readers to understand, believe, or do in their lives at that time as a result of this text, including antecedent revelation).

Simply put, this means that God, the divine author (who knows all implications exhaustively) inspires the human author (who knows much less) to write a particular message to a particular audience. The human author then writes with a particular goal of informing or persuading his readers based on a truth that he is communicating. By intending something, he is not intending other things, and he is intending to not communicate still others things.

The divine author, aware of all the truth inherent in a given message (implications), also knows the full canonical context prior to the writing of the entire canon. He knows how the text lays a foundation for later revelation. In other words he knows what the implications are because he (and he alone) knows how those words will be used in generations to come.

So acknowledging a category of implication—those things which God knows and which the human author is not consciously intending—protects the integrity of the text and the author from “speaking better than he knew.” It also protects the later understanding of the text by showing how something can have truth that is ‘hidden.’ It also means that the human author and divine author can have the same meaning.

With this three-fold distinction, we can actually exegete the passages based on the traditional literal-grammatical-historical hermeneutic. This takes into account what the original author intended his original readers to understand, based on the language and syntax he used at the time of writing. We can focus on what it says, rather than what else it might say.

Having done the exegetical work, we can then turn to the canonical context to see what implications this passage might contain that later come to fuller flower. We can also speak of how the truth of the text lays a foundation for later revelation in the canon of Scripture yet to be revealed, or how the text might be typological or analogical. These implications can then be preached as eternal truth because of the canonical context.

Having then done the exegetical and canonical, or biblical-theological work, we can turn to the homiletical work of application, of presenting the “world in front of the text” that the listener should inhabit having listened to the text (cf. Kuruvilla, Text to Praxis, esp. 24ff.)

So we can preach what the text meant in its original context. We can preach how the truth of text lays the foundation for the work of God in subsequent history. And we can apply the the text to the hearers by using both the meaning and the implications as the ground of significance.

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[1] Raymond E. Brown, “Hermeneutics,” in The Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, and Roland E. Murphy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 616.

*

Hirsch, Meaning, and Hermeneutics – Part 2

Part 1 is here.

By taking Hirsch’s two categories of meaning/implication and significance and dividing them into three categories of meaning, implication, and significance, all of the necessary components of interpretation are maintained, the willed type of meaning is not required to be an affair of the unconscious and thereby possibly fuller than the author intends, and the relationship of meaning to any given situation is allowed to remain limitless. Therefore, I proposes the following structure.

Meaning should be defined narrowly to be what the (human) author intended consciously to communicate in a given utterance through his choice of signs. It does not demand that the author understand or be conscious of all or any of the implications of his statement (though he might be). It only demands that he be conscious of, at the least, his primary truth intention. Meaning is discernable by considering the text itself, in light of the author’s historical context. It is determined solely by reference to the author’s immediate sitz im leben, (i.e., his historical particularity)[1] at the time of his writing. Meaning should be the same for every interpreter.

Implication would be the array of ramifications (Hirsch’s submeanings) that a particular meaning has. Implications are inseparable from the meaning. They are necessary corollaries and are consistent with meaning. The author may or may not be aware of implications. Implications however are not themselves drawn from the text (for then they would be meaning). Nor are they necessarily connected with his historical particularity though they might be. They are the necessary ramifications that a text has and are determined by the text itself. This distinction between meaning and implication allows for meaning to be an affair of consciousness and does not jeopardize the very concept of intentionality by including the possibility of non-intentionality. This allows for a text to have implications that an author might not be aware of and at the same time prevents having multiple or an additional unintended or unconscious meanings. Similar to meaning, the field of possible implications should be the same for every interpreter though two individual interpreters might find two differing yet equally valid implications.

Significance would be the application of a meaning and its implications to any given situation to which it might have relevance. It is determined within the reader/interpreter’s sitz im leben. It is limited to what can be drawn out of the legitimate meaning and implications of the text (legitimate interpretation). It is arrived at by determining the timeless value of a given utterance and its related implications and extracting those principles to the current situation. Significance is limited only by the interpreter’s sitz im leben. It does not have to be the same for every interpreter.

The benefit of such a solution is summed up easily. Contra Hirsch, this solution does not have to equivocate on “unconscious intentionality.” It can assert that meaning is an affair of the consciousness (a willed type) while preserving the innate existence of implications that the author might not be aware of. Significance remains largely unchanged.

“Why it Matters” still to come.

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[1] “Historical particularity” is borrowed from Gordon Fee (Gordon D. Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993), p. 17. It is used to indicate the occasioning context of a particular utterance.

Hirsch, Meaning, and Hermeneutics – Part 1

Here’s something a little heavier than normal for you. I post it because it was recently brought to my mind, and I am interested in some feedback on it. In  a nutshell, I am proposing that E. D. Hirsch (Validity in Interpretation) inadequately dealt with implications. This has particular significance (no pun intended) for biblical studies with respect to the divine/human authorship of Scripture.

Hirsch’s definition of meaning

Hirsch’s definition of meaning proves a good starting point for discussion. He says, “Verbal meaning is whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed (shared) by means of those linguistic signs.”[1] Hirsch stresses several factors necessary to meaning. First, it must be reproducible, i.e., able to be actualized by someone else. This is very similar to his use of shared.[2] Second, it must be determinate, i.e., possess a boundary that “discriminates what it is from what it is not.”[3] Third, it must be willed, i.e., “a distinction between what an author does mean by a word sequence and what he could mean by it.”[4] Therefore, reproducible (sharable) puts meaning in the realm of communicable (able to be understood by the recipient); determinate puts it in the realm of discriminatory (what it is vs. what it is not); and willed puts it in the realm of specificity (what is actual vs. what is possible). Kaiser adopts Hirsch’s definition for his own use in biblical studies.[5] Meaning therefore is inseparably tied to the author and his communicative intention and cannot be separated from him.

The difficulty of such a definition is that an author did not record his intentions directly for us. Therefore, it is somewhat of a problematic goal to attempt to enter the thought process of an author who, in the case of Scripture, is dead and cannot further comment on his work. However, here the “intentional fallacy”[6] objection is shown to have an inaccurate understanding of meaning. While the author’s thoughts cannot be ascertained, his truth intention is understood by the signs he chose to convey his intention. Therefore, while an author might say, “I want you to get a book,” his deeper intention (or intention behind his proposition) is of little consequence to his meaning; what he intended to communicate was his desire that the interpreter get a book. Had additional explanation been necessary to his willed type,[7] he would have chosen a more definitive set of signs with which to communicate his intention. In other words, because of the supposition that intelligible and rational communication is possible through a chosen set of signs that communicate reproducible, determinate, and willed ideas, the author chooses the set of signs that he believes will accomplish his intention. The search for intention behind the text may be loosely related to the child who asks “why?” From the parent he receives the reply that a reason is not necessary; obedience is. In the same way, an author communicates a truth intention of any sort through a set of signs. Further explanation as to his intent, while it might be interesting, is not necessary to understand the meaning.[8] For now, Hirsch’s definition will be accepted though it will later be refined slightly.

Hirsch’s definition of significance

Hirsch defines significance as “a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable.”[9] Later he says, “Significance is always ‘meaning-to,’ never ‘meaning-in.’ Significance always entails a relationship between what is in a man’s verbal meaning and what is outside it, even when that relationship pertains to the author himself or to his subject matter.”[10] As Hirsch defines significance, there is “virtually no limit to the significance of the shortest and most banal text.”[11] Hirsch’s significance is most clearly communicated by the word application, the relationship of a text to a situation outside of the text. Osborne calls this “derived meaning.”[12] In this conception, meaning is limited to a narrow corridor of authorial will or truth intention, where significance is broadened to encompass any conceivable situation to which a truth intention might have a relationship.

Hirsch’s definition of implication

For Hirsch, implication is an inherent part of meaning. Since he conceives of meaning as a “whole,”[13] an implication is a

… component within a larger whole. The distinction is between a submeaning of an utterance and the whole array of submeanings that it carries. The array, along with the principles for generating it, I call the “meaning” of the utterance, and any submeaning belonging to the array I call an “implication.”[14]

An implication is not therefore, necessarily stated, or even a product of conscious thought.[15] The determining factor for a valid implication is that it falls within the determinacy (the boundary that separates what it is vs. what it is not) of an utterance. Implications of an utterance are not limitless as significances are. They “lie within the meaning as a whole and are circumscribed by some kind of boundary which delimits that meaning. … An implication belongs within a verbal meaning as a part belongs to a whole.”[16]

Tensions involved in Hirsch’s definitions

The tension in Hirsch’s conception of meaning/implication and significance comes from his assertion that a meaning is a willed type and his inclusion of unconscious implications in meaning. For Hirsch, a type is “like a class, though it has the advantage of being a more unitary concept.”[17] A type can “always be represented by more than one instance,”[18] which he calls traits.[19] These individual instances may or may not be products of the consciousness, yet according to him they still can be considered objects of the will. “If a text has traits that point to subconscious meaning (or even conscious ones), these belong to the verbal meaning of the text only if they are coherent with the consciously willed type which defines the meaning as a whole.”[20] He likens a willed type to an iceberg of which only the top shows; however, underneath it hidden by the water is a massive foundation. The visible part is the consciousness of the will; the invisible part is the subconscious or unconscious.

The difficulty of resolving such a conception is that it is difficult to imagine that an unconscious implication (trait, submeaning) can be ascribed to a voluntary choice in anything other than a purely conceptual sense. He says, “… will involves not merely choices and goals, but voluntary choices and goals, and again our habits of language remind us of the conscious element of will.”[21] So while admitting the conscious element of will, he apparently admits an unconscious element as well and ascribes to this unconscious element an equally binding intention. However, it cannot very well be conceived that an affair of the unconscious can be a “voluntary choice.” It might be said to be consistent with the conscious as well as vitally connected to the conscious. Yet it seems tenuous at best to call it an intention since by definition, to intend is “to have in mind something as a purpose; plan; purpose.”[22] Intention similarly is “an intending, determination to do a specified thing.”[23] The question that must be wrestled with is precisely this: How can an unconscious or sub-conscious implication meet the qualifications of a voluntary, willed intention? Can something that is less than conscious (whether un- or sub-) be placed in a category of intent which is by definition an act of the mind? Does an unconscious meaning become an unintentional intention? It seems to this author that such a construct is at best tenuous, perhaps even inconsistent.

The significance of this is that there are implications in the biblical text that were unknown to the human author, but known to God as the divine author. This lays the foundation for sensus plenior, the idea that there is a fuller sense of the passage than the human author was aware of, fuller than the human author intended to communicate., but fully consistent with what God ultimately intended, particularly in light of later revelation.

Part II to come.

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[1] Hirsch, Validity, p. 31.

[2] Ibid., p. 31, 44. He says, “… reproducible, that it be always the same in different acts of construing” (p. 46.)

[3] Ibid., p. 32. See also pp. 44ff.

[4] Ibid., p. 47.

[5] Walter C. Kaiser, “Legitimate Hermeneutics,” in Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), p. 119. He cites Hirsch’s definition from an earlier chapter: “Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence…” (Hirsch, Validity, p. 8).

[6] See Payne, “Fallacy,” and Norman L. Geisler, “The Relation of Purpose and Meaning in Interpreting Scripture,” GTJ 5 (Fall 1982): 229-245. It is not possible to discuss the Intentional Fallacy in this treatment. However, the thrust of the argument is that the quest for intention is to try to get behind the text to some elusive prior determiner of meaning. See also D. A. Carson (Exegetical Fallacies, 2^nd ed. [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996], pp. 134-35) who warns of attempts to “psychoanalyze one or more of the participants in a past event, without having access to anything more than fragmentary records of the event” (p. 134). He relates this to redaction critical study that searches for reasons behind changes.

[7] See later discussion on willed type.

[8] There are exceptions to this general rule because of the possibility of misunderstanding. However, such misunderstanding does not negate the rule; it rather supports it. If multiple meanings or truth-intentions were possible from a single set of signs, then the recipient would act on what his interpretive response and the author would have no basis to disagree with the interpretation for one would be as good as another. Hence, the authorial control over language is magnified and confirmed by misunderstanding.

[9] Hirsch, Validity, p. 8.

[10] Ibid., p. 63.

[11] Ibid. He continues, “Not only can its verbal meaning be related to all conceivable states of affairs … but it can also be related to at different times to changing conditions in all conceivable states of affairs. … [it] is by nature limitless.” (p. 63).

[12] Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, p. 395. This is an unfortunate choice of words since meaning is held to be single while significance can be many.

[13] Hirsch, Validity, p. 42.

[14] Ibid., p. 62.

[15] He says, “the one negative characteristic common to all varieties of unconscious meanings is that the author was not aware of them. Obviously, this definition is not very reassuring since there is no limit to what an author may not be aware of” (p. 51).

[16] Ibid. p. 64.

[17] Ibid., p. 50.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 54.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p. 53, emphasis his.

[22] Webster’s New World Dictionary, s. v. “Intend.”

[23] Ibid. s. v. “Intention.”

A Word about Women

In Galatians 4, Paul uses two women to talk about two covenants, and he qualifies it by saying “This is allegorically speaking” (Galatians 4:24). This passage is sometimes used to show how the NT uses the OT non-literally.* It is therefore used to give license to the modern interpreter to also use the NT non-literally.

Have you ever thought about why Paul said, “This is allegorically speaking”?

Might it be because had he not qualified it, no one would have caught it?

Had Paul’s method been as standard as some would have us believe, there would be no need to say it. But because Paul was doing something out of the ordinary, he said it in order to keep the readers from treating the text literally, just like they were accustomed to doing.

So far from a license to use the OT non-literally, it is actually a reminder not to use it non-literally.

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*“Literal” means normal, as opposed to literalistic. Literal recognizes the use of figures of speech, but recognizes them as figures of speech.

You Have No Idea What You Are Doing

… but you do it pretty well … most of the time.

That’s my conclusion after reading (again) Grant Osborne’s chapter on semantics in The Hermeneutical Spiral.

You see, when you read the above sentence, you didn’t think about the historical uses of the word “conclusion” or the root meaning of the word “read.” You didn’t think of the multiple dictionary definitions (the semantic domain) of “chapter.”

In fact, the only thing you may have tripped over for a minute is the word “semantics.” And you probably didn’t care enough to look it up.

Why?

Because language is actually pretty easy.

Simply put, we know what words mean by the way that we use them every day. And when we don’t know what a word means, we explain it (i.e., define it) by using other words that we do know. (Remember, that’s what a dictionary does … explain a word you do not know by using words you [hopefully]do know.)

People have written tomes on how we use language. Some people use words like locution, illocution, perlocution. There is talk of generative grammar and transformational grammar, of surface structure and deep structure. There’s semantics and pragmatics. And of course, hermeneutics.

And you probably don’t know what any of that means.

And yet you communicate just fine.

Or at least you use words just fine. Your communication problems actually stem from things that usually have nothing to do with understanding what the words mean.

Here’s the rub: When we come to the Bible, we tend to forget everything we actually know and do with language. We treat the Bible like it’s some sort of special language.

So we know that a word only has one meaning in a sentence (when you tell your teen daughter that she can’t go to the mall, she knows that you aren’t telling her she can’t go do the dishes in the sink).

Yet we read a verse and say that a word has two or three or four meanings and spend twenty to thirty minutes building a case for all these meanings as part of the meaning of Scripture.

We know that that “close the door when you come in” means to swing the big slab of wood in the direction that covers up the hole in the wall you that you just walked through. But you don’t think of that long definition, and certainly don’t spend time explaining that long definition. And your mind doesn’t go back to the root meaning of “close” or “door.” You simply do it.

As students of the Bible, we need to recognize that the Bible is not a special use of human language.

It is normal human language just like we use today. Yes, it is between 2000 and 3500 years old, and therefore, we need to do some work on it in translation and definition of words. But we need to recognize that Bible words mean only what they meant back then. And most translations do a good job of putting that into the language that we use today.

For the most part, the language of the Bible is a lot easier than many preachers make it sound like.

And by the way, pastor, at the risk of sounding elitist, if you are quoting “Strong’s” to establish the meaning of a Greek or Hebrew word, then you are unqualified to speak about Greek or Hebrew. And most of the time, it’s unnecessary anyway. Get two or three or four good translations, and a couple of good commentaries, and go with it.

When it comes to the words of God, Let’s not confuse it. Let’s just do what we always do.

Genesis, the Resurrection, and History

RJS over at Jesus Creed relates a letter he recently received, from which I quote here:

I agree ... that it is helpful to understand Chapters 1 and 2 of Genesis as mytho-historical.  … My question relates to how to handle this issue when teaching my kids the Bible stories. My oldest is 5 yrs. old. She doesn't have any idea what "mytho-historical" means. To her, the story in Genesis 1 and 2 is no different from the resurrection story when I read it out of a kids' Bible stories book. One is naturally as historical as the other, in her mind.

To me, that is pretty interesting. Someone just reading the text without burden or prejudice, thinks that Genesis 1-2 sound like real events, just like the resurrection.

The letter continues:

Is it better to wait until kids are older to begin to discuss these issues? If not now, at what age, and what is a good way to raise it? And if I wait, do I set up a crisis of faith when she later learns that I don't really view Genesis 1 & 2 (and perhaps other passages) as history in the same way I view the other, central NT stories I've been teaching her.

I think you will set up a crisis of faith when she discovers this strange hermeneutic you have. My guess is that she will wonder why, if Genesis 1-2 are not actual history, you think the resurrection and other NT stories are.

I have to admit I wonder the same thing.

I think it smacks of what my theology professor used to refer to as “brush pile theology.” It is theology that is unintegrated with the whole of revelation. It’s what leads us to say that “this is historical and this is not” and then just leave the piles sitting there uncomfortably separated, sticking out a like a haystack in the Biltmore house. Everyone knows there is something wrong, but it’s at the Biltmore house, right? Surely they don’t make such a mistake. It’s an emperor with no clothes. But because some PhD from TopNotch U said it, people fall in line.

Now make no mistake. There are hard historical questions in the Bible. But Genesis 1-2 is not one of them. It could hardly be easier.

He ends with:

Any wise advice from others who've already confronted this issue with young kids would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Here’s my advice: Believe that Genesis 1-2 is actual history and teach your children to believe that. It brings several benefits.

First, you will be like Jesus and the rest of the biblical authors who believed that Genesis 1-2 were actual history, and that’s pretty good company to be in.

Second, you won’t have to deal with the burdens of a scientific community who can’t explain why things are the way they are, but you can rather recognize that things are the way they are because God created them with order just the way that  he said he did. The reality is that there is too much in the “scientific community” that makes no sense in their worldview (and most of them know it). Only in the biblical worldview with a Creator God as revealed in Genesis 1-2 does the material world actually make sense.

Third, you won’t have to find some torturous explanation for your daughter as to why some of the Bible is worthy of your belief but other parts are not.

Simplistic? Sure

Out of touch with reality? According to some … some who are not omniscient, who have hard questions because we do not know everything.

Since we do not know everything, it seems a reach to assert that Genesis 1-2 is not actual history since there is nothing in either the text or the material world that would lead us to believe that.

So why not simply say that?

I don’t know …

Makes Me Laugh

I am always humored when people who do not believe in the authority of authorial intent object when someone uses their words in a way that they did not intend them to be used.

Vanhoozer on Morality and Hermeneutics

Justin Taylor, at Between Two Worlds, interviews professor and author Kevin Vanhoozer about his move to Wheaton. The end of the interview is about the tenth anniversary edition of Is There a Meaning in This Text?, a book about interpretation. Vanhoozer comments on the subtitle of his book, “The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge”:,

Let me begin by saying that my subtitle alludes to Van Harvey's important work, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief. Harvey argues that it is immoral--always, everywhere, and by everyone--to believe something except on the basis of sufficient evidence. This makes criticism more "moral" than faith. So much for the modern morality of knowledge. What I wanted to call attention to was that some postmoderns move in the opposite direction, succumbing not to intellectual pride but sloth by maintaining that it is immoral (they say "violent") to make claims about a text's determinate meaning.

Hermeneutics is a subset of ethics because interpretation aims at a certain kind of good, namely, understanding. In my book I argue for the importance of what I call the interpretative virtues: habits of mind that are more conducive than not to getting understanding. In particular, humility is a key interpretive virtue without which readers cannot do justice to authors as "others." Other interpretive virtues include honesty, openness, and attentiveness. Ultimately, the interpretive virtues are not merely intellectual, nor even moral, but spiritual and theological. For truly to be honest, humble, self-critical, and open is to be a person with certain dispositions, many of which are related to the fruit of the Spirit.